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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     MICHAEL PHILIP KAUFMAN,
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                     Plaintiff,
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                                               16 Cv. 2880 (AKH)
                 v.
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      MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
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                     Defendant.
8
                                                New York, N.Y.
9
                                                January 16, 2020
                                                11:00 a.m.
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      Before:
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                         HON. ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN,
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
      LISTON ABRAMSON LLP
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           Attorneys for Plaintiff
16
      BY: RONALD ABRAMSON
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      BY: AHMED J. DAVIS
           JASON W. WOLFF
20
           LEAH A. EDELMAN
           EXCYLYN HARDIN-SMITH
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(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. ABRAMSON: Ronald Abramson, of Liston & Abramson

LLP, for the plaintiff, Michael Philip Kaufman, and with me are

Ari Jaffess and Alex Patchen of my firm.

THE COURT: And you are?

MR. KAUFMAN: Michael Kaufman.

THE COURT: OK. For the defendant.

MR. DAVIS: Good morning again, your Honor. My name is Ahmed Davis, from the law firm of Fish & Richardson, on behalf of Microsoft. I have here with me my colleagues Jason Wolff, Leah Edelman, and Excylyn Hardin-Smith.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

We will begin by doing the motion and it's defendant's motion. So Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. We have actually split the argument up into three parts. So Mr. Wolff is going to handle the summary judgment of noninfringement, Ms. Edelman will handle the argument with respect to Schemalive, and Ms. Hardin-Smith will handle the argument with respect to willfulness.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. WOLFF: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Wolff, one of the first things about a

litigator is to speak loudly and clearly.

MR. WOLFF: I will do my best, your Honor.

I am going to handle the noninfringement summary judgment motion. That's Docket No. 111. My colleagues will handle the other parts of it, as Mr. Davis had mentioned.

If I could start by refreshing your Honor what this case is about. It's about software that is used by people to access databases. And there's two parts to this software that kind of matter for the summary judgment motion. One is what happens when you write code for these computer applications. And the second is what happens when you run the code for the computer applications, in other words, what the user might see.

If anything should be apparent to your Honor from the briefing, it's that there is a claim construction dispute between the parties. This is a legal issue that needs to be resolved before trial under 02 Micro, that's 521 F.3d 1341, cited in the briefs. And the reason it needs to be resolved is because it will simplify the presentation of evidence to the jury, it will reduce juror confusion, and it will align the prosecution and defense of the claims between the parties, and it will void issues for appeal.

Now, Microsoft's noninfringement motion depends on two claim construction issues. And under either one, Microsoft contends Mr. Kaufman has not shown that there is a genuine issue of triable fact that would warrant having a trial, and

that if either is decided in Microsoft's favor, summary judgment should be granted.

Now, how did we get here? As the case progressed, Mr. Kaufman's infringement theory changed. In his Local Patent Rule 6 disclosures, which were Docket No. 33, he identified Microsoft ASP.NET Dynamic Data as the alleged infringing product.

Now, as discovery progressed, and we received Mr.

Kaufman's expert report from Dr. Dennis Shasha, he changed that theory. He changed that theory and acknowledged in a sense that the scanning limitation was not performed by the accused product, Microsoft ASP.NET Dynamic Data. And what he did is he changed that theory to say that, when a person uses some other software, Visual Studio, and invokes another special tool called an Object Relational Mapper, that now the scanning limitation is satisfied.

He never supplemented his local patent rule disclosures. He never told us he was changing the theory. So now we are with a claim construction dispute where the two sides have fundamentally differing views on what the claims mean. The first is the scanning limitation, and the second is a limitation found in claim C, or subpart C of the claims, which refers to integrating into each of the mode's display processes for representing, navigating, and managing records across tables.

So let me first address the scanning limitation. Mr. Kaufman's expert has two constructions, one for validity and another for infringement. If you have at your disposal, and I can hand it to you if it would help, Docket No. 113-14, this is Exhibit N to the summary judgment motion. Would your Honor like a copy?

THE COURT: Just talk. If I want it I can get it.

MR. WOLFF: OK. If we turn to this, this is Dr. Shasha's invalidity report, or a rebuttal to Microsoft's invalidity report. He explains on paragraph 57 -- and this is at ECF page 7 of 24 -- that human effort in the prior art is required to build applications. And that is not permitted under his claims.

At paragraph 58, he expressly says what the word automatic means. And he says that automatic means --

THE COURT: Are you building to an argument that Microsoft's process is not automatic, entirely automatic, and therefore not an infringement, is that the point?

MR. WOLFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: How do I know that without having your process proved and displayed?

MR. WOLFF: We can look at the papers that were submitted in the summary judgment, Mr. Kaufman's expert's report, where he walks through the manual steps that the developer must do in order to perform the scanning limitation.

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He says the same thing in paragraph 61, that the prior 1 art requires human effort, and that's not permitted by his 2 3 claims. The same thing again in paragraph 64 and 86 and 89. I won't recount all the things he said. You have the papers in 4 5 front of you. 6 THE COURT: What ECF number is this? 7 113-14. And the clearest example, as I MR. WOLFF: mentioned before, is paragraph 58. 8 9 THE COURT: Exhibit N? 10 MR. WOLFF: Yes, your Honor. I'm sorry. Paragraphs 11 55 and 58 make the exact same statement, which is that 12 automatic --13 THE COURT: You want me to go from 55 to 58. 14 MR. WOLFF: Yes. And it's the last sentence in 15 paragraph 55. And it concludes "automatic," and in parentheses "meaning no human labor required." 16 17 He says the same thing in paragraph 58, and throughout the report he says pretty much the same thing. 18 19 Now, in Dr. Shasha's infringement report --20 THE COURT: That's what I am looking at. 21 MR. WOLFF: Exhibit N is his rebuttal report on 22 invalidity. 23 THE COURT: Dr. Shasha's paragraph 55 begins with 24 Mr. McGoveran, is that right?

MR. WOLFF: Yes.

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1 THE COURT: And what is it in that paragraph 55 that 2 you want to bring to my attention? 3 MR. WOLFF: The last clause in the paragraph, where he 4 explains that Microsoft's expert is conflating no programming 5 with automatic, meaning no human labor required. And he is 6 saying that automatic does not allow human labor. 7 So this is his response to Microsoft's prior art that 8 it put in the case. 9 THE COURT: Why are we talking about prior art? We 10 are talking about infringement, aren't we? 11 MR. WOLFF: We are. The point I am making is that 12 there is a claim construction dispute, and Mr. Kaufman's expert 13 has two constructions for automatically generating and how that 14 relates to the scanning limitation. 15 THE COURT: I was asked to define automatic, wasn't I? 16 MR. WOLFF: You were, your Honor, in the original 17 briefing. 18 And if I may --THE COURT: One minute. 19 20 MR. WOLFF: The parties withdrew the request for the 21 construction, and this is before Mr. Kaufman changed his 22 infringement theory.

THE COURT: Well, I didn't define automatic. I defined only that which was in dispute.

MR. WOLFF: Correct. And the parties submitted a

paper to your Honor, at Docket No. 62, where they said that they seemed to agree on what the meaning of this term was. I have that if you would like it. I could hand it to your Honor.

THE COURT: What was your agreement?

MR. WOLFF: Well, the agreement specified in there,
Microsoft said just what it said here, which is that automatic,
as it's used in the claims and applied to the scanning
limitation, means that no separate developer input occurs.

THE COURT: Is that satisfactory to the plaintiff?

MR. WOLFF: I don't know.

THE COURT: I am asking the plaintiff.

Is it satisfactory to you, Mr. Abramson?

MR. ABRAMSON: Your Honor, could you repeat that, please?

THE COURT: No separate developer input occurs.

MR. ABRAMSON: Your Honor, we have to be careful about what is the subject matter of that, but for the actual scanning limitation itself, we agree. We agree. The actual scanning operation itself, we agree.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Proceed.

MR. WOLFF: Mr. Abramson is qualifying the agreement. But the point that Mr. Kaufman's expert made in the rebuttal report on invalidity was that no human effort could occur, which is essentially the same thing as no separate developer input occurs. It precludes the developer from doing anything,

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from clicking on menus, from doing pull-downs, and writing code.

THE COURT: And your position is that there is some developer input.

MR. WOLFF: Exactly, your Honor.

THE COURT: How do you prove that?

MR. WOLFF: How I prove that is that I turn to Exhibit C, which is Docket No. 113-3, and this is Dr. Shasha's infringement report, and at paragraphs 37 through 50, he illustrates all the developer input, or most of it, that he had to do to generate one of these programs.

And if you will turn to paragraph 37, and this is at page 5 of 17, Docket 117-3.

THE COURT: It shows what happens when Visual Studio is opened.

MR. WOLFF: Correct. Visual Studio is not the alleged infringing product.

And from this, in paragraph 38 --

THE COURT: Visual Studio is not what?

MR. WOLFF: Is not the alleged infringing product.

THE COURT: How do you prove that you have human involvement, that there is separate developer input?

MR. WOLFF: By stepping through the steps that he illustrated in this report. And if you could indulge me, I can walk you through each one of these so you can see what is

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MR. WOLFF:

1 happening. Go ahead. 2 THE COURT: 3 MR. WOLFF: At paragraph 38, he shows that the 4 developer has to create a new project. And here he said that 5 you had to specify it by using a mouse and clicking on ASP.NET Dynamic Data entity's website, and then you would click on the 6 7 OK button at the bottom of the screen capture. The next thing you would have to do is shown at 8 9 paragraph 39. Here, he shows that the developer needs to add a 10 relational database to the project. 11 THE COURT: He says the selection in this case, and 12 that goes back to the previous selection. 13 Right. He is identifying some of the code MR. WOLFF: 14 that gets generated. 15 THE COURT: Where is that? MR. WOLFF: It's at the last clause at the sentence on 16 17 paragraph 39. 18 THE COURT: So that ASP.NET Dynamic Data entity's 19 website appears on the screen third from the bottom. 20 So you are saying that the developer has to check 21 that, he has to click on that? 22 MR. WOLFF: Are you referring to paragraph 38? 23 THE COURT: Yes.

THE COURT: The developer would double click that?

Yes, your Honor.

1	MR. WOLFF: Correct.
2	THE COURT: Is it your contention that shows human
3	involvement?
4	MR. WOLFF: It does, your Honor.
5	THE COURT: So that in itself contradicts automatic.
6	MR. WOLFF: Correct.
7	THE COURT: And that's why you think you're not
8	infringing.
9	MR. WOLFF: It's not the only reason.
10	THE COURT: It's one reason.
11	MR. WOLFF: It's one. If we get to the other
12	paragraphs, I can show you where he identifies the scanning
13	limitation being performed.
14	THE COURT: Go ahead.
15	MR. WOLFF: So after the developer has clicked on this
16	project, and here Dr. Shasha's shows in paragraph 40 the
17	developer has to open up another menu, has to go find this
18	database called AdventureWorksLT2012_Data.mdf.
19	THE COURT: It says, "Visual Studio automatically
20	generates various files for the website, which collectively are
21	called a 'solution,' including the 'Global.asax' file discussed
22	later."
23	So we have a screen.
24	MR. WOLFF: Right. Are you looking at paragraph 40?
25	THE COURT: I am looking at 39.

MR. WOLFF: So paragraph 39 is referring to the figure that's under it.

THE COURT: And Global.asax appears on the screen as a subset to default.

MR. WOLFF: Correct. And this would be some of the project files the programmer is going to have to go back and modify in subsequent steps.

THE COURT: That is another example of why human beings are involved and it's not automatic.

MR. WOLFF: Exactly.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. I will get back to you. I want to get Mr. Abramson's take on this so far.

MR. ABRAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

I would say that, as far as this is concerned, the issue is what has to be automatic? And if you look at the brief, the focus of the brief on summary judgment --

THE COURT: Let's look at this.

MR. ABRAMSON: The focus of the brief was on the scanning step that Mr. Wolff was talking about. The scanning step has to be automatic, the step of scanning the database. And all we have seen here is the step of telling it what database to scan.

THE COURT: So you have to have a human being instruct as to the particular database that you're interested in. Once he does that, makes that double click, he is finished.

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MR. ABRAMSON: When you are done on that, you will see in the next paragraph it mentions a file Model.edmx. the output. The scanning is done at that point. So you tell it what database to scan, and you tell it to go, to scan, and automatically --THE COURT: Let me get back to Mr. Wolff. Your response. MR. WOLFF: My response would be to point to paragraph 41, 42, 43, 44 --THE COURT: Take it slow. MR. WOLFF: -- and 45. Mr. Abramson kind of skipped over some of these steps. You don't just point to the database. You have to add the database, in paragraph 41, which shows up on the screen. The screen has now changed for the user. The developer is then going --THE COURT: The user has clicked on that certain file. MR. WOLFF: Correct. THE COURT: And out comes of the database that is

depicted at paragraph 41. Then the user picks out what he wants.

MR. WOLFF: The next thing the user has to do is tell the software Visual Studio that he needs to open a new type of a program, called an Object Relational Mapper.

THE COURT: So Mr. Abramson would say that each

particular step is automatic, but the choice of which particular files you want is a human's choice.

MR. ABRAMSON: I would actually say that the scanning step is automatic, and I would look at these figures. The Object Relational Mapper comes up in this process. As soon as you tell it what database to pick, the Object Relational Mapper is the default. You just click OK.

THE COURT: Let's go back to the claim and show me what in the claim reaches this particular point.

MR. ABRAMSON: In the claims --

THE COURT: Claim 1.

MR. ABRAMSON: In Claim 1 --

THE COURT: Line.

MR. ABRAMSON: Bear with me on the line. I don't have the line numbers in this copy.

MR. WOLFF: Mr. Abramson, would you like a copy of the claim?

MR. ABRAMSON: I have the claims.

If you look at line 20.

THE COURT: "Causing said server to scan said database and apply a body of rules to determine the table structures, constraints and relationships of said data model, and store representations thereof in machine-readable media accessible to said server."

So causing is the result of human intervention, is it

1 | not?

MR. ABRAMSON: The actual act of causing the server to scan the database presumes that we have already identified the database. So the human effort is telling it to go.

THE COURT: That's what causing means.

MR. ABRAMSON: That's it.

THE COURT: What is your take on that, Mr. Wolff?

MR. WOLFF: Referring back to the claim, and particularly the preamble, line 2, for automatically generate, a processer -- I'm sorry, line 1.

THE COURT: "A method for operating a server comprising a processer for automatically generating an end-user interface."

MR. WOLFF: Correct. We can stop right there for a second. And the reason that clause is important is because the "automatically generating" language applies and brings life and meaning into each limitation, steps A, B and C. And as a consequence, it is the processer, not the user, that needs to be performing each of the steps A, B and C.

THE COURT: The processer may use the step, but the human being is saying which step to deal with.

MR. WOLFF: The human being is saying which step to deal with, but the process is more involved than just identifying a database.

As it shows in document 113-3, paragraph 42, you have

to go in to this software tool Visual Studio. You need to open this Object Relational Mapper, which is called LINQ to SQL or an ADO.NET Entity Framework. You can see the selections in the figure there. There's four different options that the user can select for its preferences.

The next step in paragraph 43 shows that the user needs to then select the database and click continue.

The following paragraphs --

THE COURT: So each particular step automatically generates an end-user interface.

MR. WOLFF: No. We are not even to limitation C.

THE COURT: I am reading from the first sentence, line

1. "A method for operating a server comprising a processer for automatically generating an end-user interface." That's where the word automatic appears.

MR. WOLFF: Yes, your Honor.

MR. ABRAMSON: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ABRAMSON: If you look at the end of the preamble, it says "said method comprising," and it has A, B and C.

What has to be automatic, your Honor is A, B and C. The preamble of the claim presumes you're going to go through the operation. The whole purpose of this invention is to be able to take any arbitrary database, just pick any database, and automatically create a user interface for it.

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THE COURT: I understand that. 1 MR. ABRAMSON: You have to tell it what database to 2 3 And we are talking now about the step B. use. 4 THE COURT: I have got it, Mr. Abramson. 5 MR. ABRAMSON: So step B --THE COURT: Let Mr. Wolff finish. 6 7 MR. WOLFF: So the point is that the user has to go through and specify all these preferences, by clicking on 8 9 menus, clicking on pull-down menus, specifying parameters, in 10 order to have the scanning function occur. So by definition it 11 is not automatic; it's requiring separate developer input. 12 THE COURT: Automatic, does that appear anyplace other 13 than line 2? 14 MR. WOLFF: It does refer to other spots in the claim 15 where it refers to automatic. THE COURT: Line 2 is automatically generating. Once 16 17 there is a choice and a selection, then there is an automatic 18 generation of its end use.

MR. WOLFF: We haven't even generated the user interfaces yet. We are still at the process of just telling what preferences the developer has for how to set up and generate -- to scan the database to generate a data model.

MR. ABRAMSON: Your Honor, that's not correct. The set up that's involved here is identifying the database. The Object Relational Mapper, if you look at paragraph 42, the

black thing that's highlighted, that's the default that's given to you automatically by that screen. You don't have to go find it, select it, tell it what it is. It's there.

THE COURT: Let me stop you both. If we were to have a trial on this issue, would you, Mr. Wolff, be trying this on the basis of an actual use of your procedures or would you be trying it through the words of the plaintiff's expert?

MR. WOLFF: Both.

THE COURT: Would you not be better off in allowing the proof to come in before I can deal with this issue, where you're both arguing in different ways and there is no real rationale for me to say who is right and who is wrong?

MR. WOLFF: Your Honor, the issue is that the parties have a fundamental disagreement as to the meaning of the automatic and how that applies to the scanning and each of these limitations here.

THE COURT: It's not that you're disagreeing on the word automatic. You're disagreeing on when an automatic operation comes into play and when it ends.

MR. WOLFF: And from start to finish, the only thing that was supposed to happen in the patent is to identify a database. No other steps, no other user interfaces were supposed to be presented to the user except the final step, the database access interfaces which are found at step C.

THE COURT: I am not able to give you summary judgment

on this issue. It's not clear in my mind. I struggled with this and with the language. In the Markman hearing, I expressed reluctance to interpret matters in a way that would aid one party and not the other. I was struggling to find a neutral definition of terms, not to add terms, not to subtract terms, but to give interpretive value to the entire expression, in the context of the invention.

I can't tell you who is right, whether there is contemplated a human selection that itself will then cause an automatic generation of some other function or some other result or whether everything has to be automatic.

MR. WOLFF: Can we resolve the claim construction issue?

THE COURT: Which one?

MR. WOLFF: Automatic.

THE COURT: You agreed on a definition.

MR. ABRAMSON: I think we have resolved it.

THE COURT: No separate developer impact occurs.

MR. WOLFF: Input.

THE COURT: No separate developer input is required.

MR. WOLFF: All right. Let me address the second issue since I know where your Honor is headed on that.

The second issue relates to limitation C in the patent, limitation C in each of the claims. And if you will refer to the claim, paragraph 377 of the patent, line 31.

THE COURT: Yes, I have it in front of me.

MR. WOLFF: It says, "Integrates into each said mode display processes for representing, navigating and managing said relationships across tables."

There is another claim construction dispute here.

THE COURT: And I was asked at the *Markman* to define "and" as "and/or," and I declined to do so.

MR. WOLFF: Correct.

THE COURT: And the parties have different arguments here.

MR. WOLFF: Correct. Mr. Kaufman's position is that it means and/or, meaning that each said mode does not need to have all three display processes. And Microsoft's position is that each process must have each process: Representing, navigating, and managing. And this is just a basic grammar issue. There is no factual dispute on this issue.

THE COURT: Mr. Abramson.

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, your Honor. I don't know that it's a dispute over exactly what the word "and" means. It's a dispute over what the word "and" implies for the construction.

Microsoft is arguing here that the word "and" means that, not only must each mode display integrate some processes, but that it also has to integrate each and every one of the listed processes. Our position on this is the word "and" serves to define the set of processes that have be integrated

in the displays. It doesn't go so far as to say that each and every process must be integrated into each display.

THE COURT: Integrates into each said mode. And we define mode as creation, retrieval, anything deleting.

MR. ABRAMSON: Actually, it's integrates into each said mode display. The subject of that is mode display. Then what gets integrated is processes. I don't know if that's a huge distinction, but I think that's the proper parsing.

Integrates into each said mode display processes for A, B and C. That means to us — this is the key thing. You have to interpret that in light of the specification. You can't just blindly apply rigid rules of grammar to this. The case law is very clear on this, the case law that we cited, including a decision by Judge Rakoff in 2019. It's very clear that this is the type of interpretation where you can't just go by the niceties of grammar, you have to look at the specifications.

THE COURT: We can start with the niceties of grammar.

What are the niceties of grammar here, Mr. Wolff? The phrase "integrates into each said mode display processes for representing, navigating and managing said relationships across tables." One illustration you gave is that in the delete mode, when something is eliminated, it's no longer represented, and you don't need to navigate it because it's not there anymore. And those two functions are absent from the delete mode. They

may be present in another mode.

Mr. Abramson argues that the integration into each mode does not necessarily mean that each of the processes has to be reflected in that particular mode. So as long as you cross the spectrum of the invention, have display processes for representing, navigating, and managing, then you satisfy the claim.

I don't know how artful that was, Mr. Abramson.

MR. ABRAMSON: I think that's accurate, and we would refer to -- reading this in light of the specification, where the specification says in the patent, on column 11, lines 45 through 49, UI is rendered for any given database table where underlying object representation is referenced. That's the result of the scanning we just talked about. And appropriate components for depicting and traversing all cross-table LINQs are automatically included in the resulting display.

So read in light of the specification, that's what it means. And if you interpret it the way Microsoft wants to interpret it, then the claim does not apply to any embodiment in the specification. It's a red flag. There is no embodiment in the specification that integrates into each mode display each of those processes.

THE COURT: Mr. Wolff, I can't define this further. We have the terms as they are, and they are not susceptible to further definition.

MR. WOLFF: Microsoft's position has been from the start that this is clear, the claim language. This patent was filed in 2001. It was prosecuted for years. An amendment was filed six years later in 2007, prosecuted for another four years. Mr. Kaufman sued Microsoft five years later. The language of the claim is clear and unambiguous. Read it says each mode display has processes for representing, navigating, and managing. It has all three.

THE COURT: I can't define on summary judgment whether your reading of this phrase or Mr. Abramson's reading of this phrase, as applied to the alleged infringing device or method, is the right one.

MR. WOLFF: Your Honor, can you resolve the claim construction issue that you raised earlier, and that was confirm that "and" does not mean "and/or."

THE COURT: I am not confirming anything. We have the phrase as it is. It is a mistake to try to single out a single word and give it meaning. It's used as it is. I am not able to make further definition in it, and we will have to deal with the entire phrase and see how it fits the evidence.

The motion for summary judgment is denied, at least the specs that Mr. Wolff is arguing.

What is the next point?

MR. WOLFF: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. EDELMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Leah Edelman

for Microsoft. I will be addressing the partial summary judgment on the Schemalive issue.

This issue is about Mr. Kaufman's local patent rule disclosure where he claimed that Schemalive, as disclosed in the '981 patent, practices the '981 patent.

THE COURT: One minute.

You need something, Mr. Abramson? Take a minute. Are you OK?

MR. ABRAMSON: I lost my pen.

THE COURT: OK. You found it.

MR. ABRAMSON: I did.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Edelman.

MS. EDELMAN: The fact is that Schemalive, as disclosed in the '981 patent, does not practice the '981 patent claim.

THE COURT: Schemalive is the plaintiff's methodology?

MS. EDELMAN: The Schemalive product is separate from, to be distinguished from the Schemalive reference implementation which is disclosed verbatim in the '981 patent specification.

THE COURT: What are you telling me, that the machine and the process used by the plaintiff is not an embodiment of the patent?

MS. EDELMAN: All we are saying is that Mr. Kaufman made a claim under the local patent rules that applied in this

case, and he said that Schemalive practices the '981 patent. 1 2 THE COURT: Did I ever order those to be applicable? 3 MS. EDELMAN: No, your Honor. They were under the 4 original scheduling order that was ordered by Judge Swain at 5 the infancy of this case. THE COURT: I didn't follow those rules. 6 7 MS. EDELMAN: That's correct, your Honor. But the parties agreed to them under that original scheduling order, 8 9 and you can see in the pleadings that those infringement --10 THE COURT: What do I care what the plaintiffs 11 actually do? MS. EDELMAN: It's a disclosure issue, your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: It leads to what? It's not relevant. 14 MS. EDELMAN: It is relevant, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: How? I am measuring infringement by what the defendant does, not by what the plaintiff does. 16 17 MS. EDELMAN: The disclosure, your Honor, is relevant 18 to these issues because, as your Honor correctly points out, 19 infringement is only between the patent claims and the accused 20 product. 21 THE COURT: Right. What do I care how the embodiment 22 in plaintiff's practices work? I don't care. 23 MS. EDELMAN: You're right, your Honor. 24 shouldn't care either, but the jury might get confused.

THE COURT: It won't get confused. There won't be any

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      evidence of it.
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               MS. EDELMAN: Regarding Schemalive?
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               THE COURT: That's the plaintiff's work?
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               MS. EDELMAN: Yes.
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               THE COURT: You need it? You want it, Mr. Abramson?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: Absolutely, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Why?
               MR. ABRAMSON: This is a demonstrative of how this
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      invention works. Absolutely we want to be able to demonstrate
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      reference limitation in the specification of the patent.
               THE COURT: I don't think it's relevant.
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               MR. ABRAMSON: Well, it's relevant to explain the
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      technology, to explain the background and what Mr. Kaufman
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      invented, because they are attacking this as being anticipated
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      by prior art.
               THE COURT: We measure the claims against the prior
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      art.
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               MR. ABRAMSON: We measure the claims against the prior
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      art, but it is a demonstrative, it's an aid to the jury.
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      does this technology work? I think it's very relevant to take
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      the actual working example in the patent.
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               THE COURT: You have an enablement in the patent
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      itself.
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               MR. ABRAMSON: We have an enablement.
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               THE COURT: And that's how it works. And we don't
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take into consideration how you actually use devices or processes. It's not relevant.

MR. ABRAMSON: The entire disclosure, all the figures in the patent, is based upon the operation of this software machine, this machine.

THE COURT: That's not part of the patent application.

MR. ABRAMSON: It is the entire specification.

THE COURT: Then we will deal with the specification.

MR. ABRAMSON: We have taken literally what is in the specification. It's a couple of hundred pages of code, that's why it's so thick. We just ran the code on the machine.

That's a demonstration which I think is the most helpful thing that the jury could see to understand what that invention is.

Let's see it run. Let's see it work.

THE COURT: That's not relevant.

MR. ABRAMSON: If I can't show that to the jury, then it's going to become very difficult, abstract. I will be limited to demonstrating their product, which we can certainly do.

THE COURT: That's what you have to do. That's the infringement issue.

MR. ABRAMSON: I want Mr. Kaufman to be able to do that. If he can't show his own product --

THE COURT: Let me have a moment.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Let me ask you what you want to prove.

You want to prove that Schemalive -- is that how it's

pronounced? You want to prove that that in which plaintiff

does is the embodiment of the patent.

MR. ABRAMSON: I don't want to prove that, your Honor.

THE COURT: What do you want to prove?

MR. ABRAMSON: I want to prove that Microsoft's product infringes the patent, and I want to use the example in the patent specification itself to explain to the jury how the invention works.

THE COURT: If you are going to compare what Microsoft does with what the plaintiff does, you have to have an ability to prove that what the plaintiff does is what the patent teaches. Otherwise you don't have the things equal to the same thing or equal to each other.

MR. ABRAMSON: I agree with that, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am not going to run that trial. I am not going to run a trial as to whether or not that which Kaufman does is that which Kaufman taught.

MR. ABRAMSON: So your concern is the prejudicial effect.

THE COURT: I am concerned about two things. I am concerned about the large expansion of trial time on an issue that is not directly relevant, nor will it help the jury and it will confuse the jury, so the element of prejudice comes in as

Because we are not focusing on what Kaufman does. 1 well. 2 MR. ABRAMSON: Understood, your Honor. 3 Can I confer with my client for one minute? 4 THE COURT: Yes. 5 Let's take ten minutes. 6 (Recess) 7 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Abramson. 8 MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, your Honor. 9 So our intent with that demonstration would be to 10 animate -- since the jury is not going to understand computer 11 code, which is a couple of hundred pages of the patent --12 THE COURT: We are dealing with claims, not computer 13 code. 14 MR. ABRAMSON: I understand. If your Honor believes 15 that would be inappropriate, then that's your Honor's ruling. 16 THE COURT: I am interested in what you are going to 17 use it for. I have this little book called Anatomy of a Patent 18 Case, prepared by the Complex Litigation Committee of the 19 20 American College of Trial Lawyers, published by the Federal 21 Judicial Center 2009. On page 103, there is the following 22 discussion: 23 "Under some circumstances, courts have granted motions 24 to preclude evidence of the patentee's embodiment of the 25 Comparing the accused products to the patentee's invention.

embodiment of the invention is contrary to long-standing principles of patent law. Specifications teach. Claims claim. Infringement, literal or by equivalence, is determined by comparing an accused product not with a preferred embodiment described in the specification, or with a commercialized embodiment of the patentee, but with properly and previously construed claims in suit."

MR. ABRAMSON: I would say that's an accurate statement. Our purpose of doing this would not be to prove our case by comparing Dynamic Data against this demonstration, but rather, it's a demonstrative to show how the technology works.

THE COURT: I think that's got to be done a different way, and I am not going to allow embodiment by your commercialized product.

MR. ABRAMSON: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: That moots what you have to say, right,
Ms. Edelman?

MS. EDELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

I would mention, your Honor, I believe it also would moot our discussion regarding Microsoft's MIL number 1. This discussion that we are having now would moot our discussion regarding the first motion in limine, Microsoft's first motion in limine.

THE COURT: OK. Willfulness. Who is going to argue willfulness?

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MR. DAVIS: It will be Ms. Hardin-Smith. 1 2 MR. ABRAMSON: And Mr. Jaffess for us. 3 MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Good afternoon, your Honor. THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Hardin-Smith. 4 5 Have you signed in? 6 MS. HARDIN-SMITH: I believe so. 7 THE COURT: I know you from before. 8 MS. HARDIN-SMITH: I apologize, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Go ahead. 10 MS. HARDIN-SMITH: So I am arquing Microsoft's motion 11 for partial summary judgment of no willfulness. At the outset, 12 we would like to point out that this is Mr. Kaufman's burden to 13 prove willful infringement, and there is no record evidence at 14 all that Microsoft even had knowledge of Mr. Kaufman's '981 15 patent, let alone willfully infringed it before the filing of 16 this lawsuit. 17 One thing we want to point out is it's an essential 18 element of willful infringement that the alleged infringer have 19 knowledge of the patent-in-suit. There is absolutely no 20 evidence of that here, and, notably, Mr. Kaufman's brief, in 21 response to this summary judgment motion, is silent on this 22 point. There is no case law, they have cited no case law to 23 dispute the fact that knowledge of the patent-in-suit is an 24 essential element of willful infringement.

As your Honor, I believe, started to mention, Mr.

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Kaufman has pointed to a number of citations to Mr. Kaufman's patent publications and tries to link that to knowledge of the patent-in-suit. However, there is a sharp distinction between a patent application, and a publication of a patent application, and the actual patent-in-suit. All of the citations that Mr. Kaufman has pointed to in Microsoft's patent applications all are to patent publications of the '981 patent application, or in the '981 patent family, but none of them are to the patent-in-suit. And knowledge is an essential element of willful infringement. If there is absence of knowledge on the record, that is warranted to grant summary judgment of no willfulness. MR. JAFFESS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Ari Jaffess on behalf of the plaintiff. As a matter of law, it would be improper to find a lack of knowledge. There is sufficient evidence for a jury here to find knowledge of Mr. Kaufman's --THE COURT: Where is the knowledge? MR. JAFFESS: If you could look at our opposition brief.

THE COURT: One minute.

What is the ECF number?

MR. JAFFESS: 126, ECF page 25.

THE COURT: What page?

MR. JAFFESS: ECF 25. At the bottom it's page 21 of

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our brief. This is the timeline.
1
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               THE COURT: Page 21 of your brief?
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               MR. JAFFESS: Yes. ECF page 25 out of 30.
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               This is the timeline with the citations, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: What is the paragraph number?
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               MR. JAFFESS: There is no paragraph numbering.
 7
               THE COURT: What is the pagination?
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               MR. JAFFESS: The pagination is at the bottom right,
9
      which is our pagination.
10
               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. JAFFESS: 21.
12
               THE COURT: We are on 21.
13
               MR. JAFFESS: At the top of the page, just the
14
      timeline, it shows all of the citations. These are actually
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      the key citations. There is more than this.
               THE COURT: Just tell me here, what shows that
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     Microsoft knew about your patent?
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               MR. JAFFESS: So this shows that Microsoft patent
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      applications had Mr. Kaufman's patent publications cited
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      against them. And not just in an offhand manner. They were
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      directly cited and compared with, and the Microsoft
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      applications were rejected over Mr. Kaufman's disclosures.
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               THE COURT: The top of the blue line or below it?
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               MR. JAFFESS: The ones below, the citations are below.
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               THE COURT: So applications by Microsoft are
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     mentioned. The patent issued when?
               MR. JAFFESS: In 2011, February 8.
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               THE COURT: So before that the application was not
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      published.
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               MR. JAFFESS: The application was published, the
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      claims were not issued. But the claims were pending in the
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      family, the claims --
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               THE COURT: Does Microsoft have an obligation to
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      refrain from practicing that which is in the application if it
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      believes that the application is not valid?
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               MR. JAFFESS: Once it's issued, they absolutely do.
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               THE COURT: So it's when it's issued?
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               MR. JAFFESS: Yes.
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               THE COURT: We are looking only then at items 3 in
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      green.
               MR. JAFFESS: Well, the knowledge doesn't go away once
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      it issues. They have knowledge of the family, of its pendency,
      their sophisticated actor. These aren't random, offhand
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19
      citations.
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               THE COURT: Let me ask you again. Supposing you know
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      that there is an application for a patent pending and you in
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      good faith believe that that application is not valid, are you
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      obligated to refrain from practicing what ultimately becomes an
24
      infringement?
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               MR. JAFFESS: Before it becomes an infringement,
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1 before it issues?

THE COURT: Before it issues.

MR. JAFFESS: We have no evidence of their good-faith belief or any belief because they have shielded it with privilege, as is their right. But there is an absence of that information. What we know is that Microsoft was aware of this patent family --

THE COURT: What do you mean a patent family?

MR. JAFFESS: So there are multiple patents that get applied for with the same disclosure. Their claims can differ.

THE COURT: So that just shows confusion; it doesn't show knowledge.

MR. JAFFESS: It does not directly show knowledge, but it circumstantially shows knowledge. And some of the people involved --

THE COURT: You want me to rule -- you don't want me to rule.

MR. JAFFESS: No, I don't. As a matter of law, you can't rule that there is no knowledge.

THE COURT: So let me ask Ms. Hardin-Smith. What is the legal effect of matters related to the patent in question when the patent issues?

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: As to willful infringement, your Honor, none. The essential element is it has to be knowledge of the patent-in-suit. It cannot be knowledge of the patent

family, it cannot be knowledge of the patent publications related to the patent-in-suit.

THE COURT: Well, the patent comes out February 8, 2011, and Microsoft continues to infringe, for the sake of our discussion here. If there is no infringement, there is no willfulness. So we are only dealing with this subject on the assumption that what you did was infringing and on the assumption that the patent is valid. So given those assumptions, if you knew the patent — and you are charged with knowledge on February 8, 2011, are you not?

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Absolutely. As of February 8, 2011, we are charged with knowledge of the patent-in-suit.

What you will notice in the timeline that Mr. Jaffess has referred you to, the numbers 3 and 4, the patent application citations, those are not to the patent-in-suit; those are to patent applications, published applications related to the '981 patent application.

THE COURT: Where do you see 3 and 4?

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: It's on the same page that Mr. Jaffess referred you to on page 21.

THE COURT: I am looking at the timeline on top of the page.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: I am looking at the timeline at the top of the page.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: That's correct. If you see numbers 3 and 4 -- I'm sorry, number 3 in green on the bottom of the timeline.

THE COURT: There are two green numbers 3.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: That's correct. And although those fall after the patent issued, those particular citations do not cite to the patent-in-suit, your Honor; they cite to patent application publications related to the '981.

THE COURT: Wouldn't you say this is an issue of fact?

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Maybe I should add this. If there is an issue of willfulness, it will not be put to the jury and not be tried until after a finding of infringement. Wouldn't it be better for me, and for you, for me to deny your motion at this point in time and if it comes up, it comes up after a finding of infringement?

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: No, it would not be better, in our opinion, because it will add extra time that is unnecessary to the case. Because at the outset, there is no factual dispute here. Although Mr. Kaufman is pointing to a patent publication --

THE COURT: I think Mr. Davis is anxious to have a word with you.

MR. DAVIS: Actually, your Honor, respectfully, I wanted to have a word with your Honor. I just want to make

sure, if your Honor is --

THE COURT: No. We have got Ms. Hardin-Smith and she is quite capable.

MR. DAVIS: Absolutely.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: So just a quick follow-up to what you're stating regarding willful infringement. Our question is if you would like to bifurcate the case, so that in that sense there would be no evidence of willful infringement in the initial phrase.

THE COURT: Absolutely not.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: OK.

So where we left off, there is no issue, there is no genuine issue of fact here.

THE COURT: I should tell you this because we will get to it later. My thought is to have three phases to this trial. Number one is validity and infringement, or infringement and validity. I am not sure what the sequence will be. Number two is damages. Number three is willfulness. So there will be no proof of damages in the first section. There will be no proof of willfulness in sections one and two.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Understood, your Honor.

So we still believe that willfulness can be resolved now because there is no triable issue of fact.

THE COURT: It's a little confusing to me here. If the references in December of 2006 and December of 2009 to

Kaufman advised Microsoft of the nature of the patent that is ultimately issued on February 8, 2011, I get confused because that seems to suggest that the patent doesn't do anything except enlarge the time span of the earlier patent, which would be a patent abuse.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Your Honor, there is one patent here that is issued, and that was on February 8, 2011.

THE COURT: The '981 patent.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: I will ask this to Mr. Jaffess. If the references in December 2006 and 2009 sufficiently advised Microsoft of your patent, how can the patent office issue still another patent, the '981 patent, in February 2011?

MR. JAFFESS: Those were pending patent applications that had claims that were different but similar to those that ultimately did issue. But those are publications, those are not themselves patents.

THE COURT: How can that advise anybody of anything?

MR. JAFFESS: The people involved in those patent

applications, at least one of them, were actually involved in
the Dynamic Data product, the Microsoft folks.

The Microsoft application that was rejected was actually called "Automatically Generating Web Forms from Database Schema."

THE COURT: They were rejected.

MR. JAFFESS: Yes. Microsoft had an application with that title that was rejected over Mr. Kaufman's pending patent application, and some of the people that were involved were also involved in Dynamic Data.

THE COURT: I don't see where there is proof that Microsoft knew of your patent.

MR. JAFFESS: Proof is not required, direct proof. It is sufficient proof for a jury to reasonably find that they were on notice, and the sum total of all of this evidence, your Honor, is sufficient.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Your Honor, if I may add a few points. One, Mr. Kaufman was aware as early as 2011 of the potential that Mr. Microsoft might have infringed his patent and never notified Microsoft.

THE COURT: I am aware of it.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: This is in Mr. Kaufman's deposition testimony.

THE COURT: I am aware of that.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: So he at no point chose to notify Microsoft.

THE COURT: Another way of setting up a willfulness is by giving specific notice, Hey, you're infringing my patent, cease and desist.

MR. JAFFESS: Your Honor, there was notice provided at the filing of suit, and there is also the concept of post-suit

willfulness. In light of the clear allegations in this litigation, Microsoft continued to leave Dynamic Data on offer to the public.

THE COURT: Supposing there is an good-faith belief that your patent stinks?

MR. JAFFESS: We have no knowledge of that because -THE COURT: They have responded to your lawsuit by
answering it and alleging defenses.

MR. JAFFESS: That's an issue of fact, your Honor, the reasonableness of that belief and what belief that was.

THE COURT: What you want to do is punish Microsoft for defending against your lawsuit.

MR. JAFFESS: It's for continuing to leave it on offer after the lawsuit was filed when infringement and validity were clear. And there is case law that we cited regarding the reasonableness of such defenses and that they are not a defense to willfulness, your Honor.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Your Honor, if I may also add, Mr. Kaufman's allegations of post-suit willful infringement should be waived as untimely. At no point did Mr. Kaufman notify Microsoft of its allegation of post-suit willful infringement until --

THE COURT: His lawsuit. He had his notification there.

In your brief -- do you know the ECF number?

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: What are you referencing, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am asking Mr. Jaffess. He says there are cases that say that post-filing infringement would be the basis for willfulness.

MR. JAFFESS: Yes, your Honor. 22 to 23 of our brief.

THE COURT: 143, right? Your brief is 143?

MR. JAFFESS: 126, your Honor.

THE COURT: I decline to follow the two cases you cite, one in the District Court of Delaware and the other in the Eastern District of Texas. It seems to me that if you have a good-faith belief in your defenses, that you should be able to litigate the lawsuit. Willfulness in that context is a stratagem to double the scope of your damage and obtain other kinds of relief that are normally unavailable to a patent case. So I grant the motion with regard to striking willfulness.

MS. HARDIN-SMITH: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. JAFFESS: Your Honor, for clarity, you were talking about post. You are granting the motion as to pre as well?

THE COURT: You have not given notice. There is nothing in the record to show that they had knowledge of your patent and knowledge of their infringement, and you have to show actual knowledge.

MR. JAFFESS: Your Honor, if I might, on the timeline

1	once more.
2	THE COURT: Yes.
3	MR. JAFFESS: There's citations in late 2011 and 2014.
4	THE COURT: Let me pick it up again.
5	MR. JAFFESS: Just two points. These citations were
6	after the patent issued.
7	MS. HARDIN-SMITH: I might add they are two patent
8	publications. Those are the citations. They are not citations
9	to the patent-in-suit.
10	MR. JAFFESS: I would also add
11	THE COURT: These are items 3 you're talking about,
12	right?
13	MR. JAFFESS: It's at the bottom towards the right, in
14	late 2011, November 29, 2011, and October 8, 2014.
15	THE COURT: There is a green number 3.
16	So what is cited against Microsoft?
17	MR. JAFFESS: I believe it was the publication of the
18	ultimately issued patent which had already issued.
19	THE COURT: You believe or was it?
20	MR. JAFFESS: I would have to double-check, your
21	Honor.
22	THE COURT: If it's not a citation to the patent
23	itself, then it doesn't show actual knowledge.
24	MR. JAFFESS: Because of privilege there wouldn't be
25	actual knowledge here, your Honor. They have provided a

privilege log, which we have provided to your Honor, where these citations were discussed.

THE COURT: That means they can't use it, but you can't use it either.

Answer my question. If the patent were a bar to their application, it would have been cited. But the citation was not to their patent, it was to an application.

MR. JAFFESS: Your Honor, if I might. It's the same patent and patent examiners don't always cite the most recent item in a patent family. To them, it's not a concern about the patents, it's a concern about the disclosure. But when someone looks at it on the flip side, when it's been cited to them, it's very clear it has been issued.

THE COURT: You have to show me the language of that citation that would cause me to believe that there is a proof of actual knowledge.

MR. JAFFESS: If I could have a few minutes.

THE COURT: You can have it.

(Pause)

THE COURT: It's obviously not in the record of this motion, right?

MR. JAFFESS: The fact that it was cited is in the record, your Honor.

THE COURT: The fact of the citation is in the record, but the citation itself and the knowledge that would arise from

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it is not. 1 2 MR. JAFFESS: Understood, your Honor. THE COURT: The motion of defendant's to strike the 3 4 claim of willfulness, to dismiss it, is granted. 5 We need to now go into the next phase. Let's do the motions in limine I guess. 6 7 MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, your Honor. That's correct. THE COURT: Kaufman motion number 1 moves to exclude 8 9 reference to or arguments advanced in the inter partes review 10 proceedings in the patent office. 11 Now, admission by the party is relevant. The fact of 12 the proceedings, or the location of the admission, is not 13 relevant. 14 Now, having had those rulings, what is left for me to deal with, Mr. Abramson? 15 16 MR. ABRAMSON: Nothing, your Honor. I think that's 17 sufficient. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Davis. MR. DAVIS: Ms. Edelman. 19 20 MS. EDELMAN: Your Honor, that would also resolve 21 Microsoft's motion in limine number 4. 22 THE COURT: So we have dealt with that. Kaufman motion number 2 moves to exclude Microsoft's 23 24 expert from testifying about claim construction.

What is the relevance of that, Ms. Edelman?

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1 Who is doing this? MR. ABRAMSON: Which motion in limine? 2 3 THE COURT: Kaufman motion number 2, moving to exclude 4 Microsoft's expert to testify about claim construction. 5 MR. ABRAMSON: The issue here is that the expert 6 submitted a report, gave deposition testimony. 7 THE COURT: I asked Mr. Jaffess to respond. the relevance? 8 9 MR. JAFFESS: Sorry. 10 THE COURT: I have got the wrong guy. 11 Mr. Wolff. 12 MR. WOLFF: Microsoft has no intention of having its 13 expert testify about claim construction other than to just use 14 the constructions that were provided by the Court. There are 15 certain terms in the claims that have not been resolved by the Court. You addressed two of those. 16 17 THE COURT: There is not going to be an expert testifying about that, I don't think. 18 19 MR. WOLFF: It should apply to both sides. No expert 20 should be testifying about claim construction. Mr. McGoveran 21 in his report provides a foundational basis for his opinions, 22 and that is what they are complaining about. 23 THE COURT: The proposition is neither side can have

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an expert testifying about claim construction.

MR. WOLFF: Correct.

(212) 805-0300

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with that, Mr. Abramson?

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, I am, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then that's done.

Kaufman motion number 3, to cure prejudice from Microsoft's alleged spoliation of usage data, Kaufman seeks to preclude Microsoft from introducing certain evidence and arguments regarding usage data.

I need some help on this motion. Remind me about the spoliation.

MR. ABRAMSON: Mr. Patchen will address that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PATCHEN: Good afternoon. Alex Patchen on behalf of plaintiff.

So in this case we have asked Microsoft to produce documents or to determine ultimately how many users of Dynamic Data were there? We have gotten consistently differing stories from Microsoft. First they provided data from 2017 forward, says there wasn't any. Then during the deposition of their 30(b)(6) witness on this, it turns out that there was data that went further back that they had not obtained. And that information was actually removed after this litigation was filed and a litigation hold should have been put in place.

THE COURT: Just a minute. In an answer to an interrogatory, Microsoft answered it had no customers. But in

a 30(b)(6) deposition, what did you learn?

MR. PATCHEN: In answer to its interrogatory, it said it had some telemetry data.

THE COURT: What kind of data?

MR. PATCHEN: Telemetry, which is data that shows how many people created a Dynamic Data project on a two-day basis.

THE COURT: What is telemetry?

MR. PATCHEN: It's recording. So the way this worked is any time there was a user who opened or created a Dynamic Data project in a one-month period twice --

THE COURT: So it has telemetry data of use.

MR. PATCHEN: Correct. They provided limited telemetry data from middle of 2017 to 2018. When we had asked for further data going back further in time, we were told that they had deleted the data for a number of reasons, including because of GDPR.

THE COURT: Because of what?

MR. PATCHEN: European privacy protection rules that went into place, GDPR.

THE COURT: In other words, they were forced to delete the information by operation of law.

MR. PATCHEN: They didn't go that far. They said they wanted to be in compliance with the European privacy law. The telemetry data they produced was US-related user, so it doesn't necessarily require -- they might not have been in violation of

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the law otherwise.

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THE COURT: They gave you information about US

3 telemetry users between 2017 and 2018 and not before.

MR. PATCHEN: That's correct.

THE COURT: And they gave you no information about European use.

MR. PATCHEN: That's correct. We are not seeking information as to European use because it's a US patent.

THE COURT: And the documents showing the possibility of usage data before 2017 were deleted.

MR. PATCHEN: Correct. And that was the testimony from their 30(b)(6) witness.

THE COURT: And the pretext was the European rule?

MR. PATCHEN: He said that amongst other reasons.

didn't provide any further detail.

THE COURT: What remedy do you want?

MR. PATCHEN: We are seeking two remedies: One, that they can't now come in and try to provide usage data from an earlier period of time; and two --

THE COURT: Earlier period before 2017.

MR. PATCHEN: That's correct. And what we are talking about is specifically telemetry information. If they want to use qualitative information to try to say that the usage was low, we are not objecting to that.

THE COURT: Did they give you that information? Is

that spoiliated?

MR. PATCHEN: They ultimately pick and chose and found some limited information as to some usage from 2011 using a different system which they themselves, their witness called completely random. So that information should not be presented.

The other relief we are seeking is because --

THE COURT: I am still not clear what the first is. You want them not to be able to prove any usage data.

MR. PATCHEN: Not to be able to provide any form of alternate usage data.

THE COURT: What is alternate usage data?

MR. PATCHEN: For example, the main telemetry information was from the 2017 to '18 period. Microsoft did make efforts, when we raised this issue, to find whatever they could find. They were able to find some limited information from a further back period of time from data called SQM data, which is a different type of telemetry, through different systems, which they themselves have said is unreliable.

THE COURT: What is it you want me to do, rule that they cannot use any data to show use and nonuse before 2017?

MR. PATCHEN: That's the first part of the relief we are seeking.

THE COURT: What is the second part?

MR. PATCHEN: The second is, in order for -- 2011 is

when the patent issued. That's the key date from a reasonable royalty perspective.

THE COURT: Can't you give me a succinct statement of what remedy you want from me?

MR. PATCHEN: The second relief is for them not to be to challenge the methodology that our damage expert used to estimate what the usage was in 2011.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. PATCHEN: Because they should have retained data going further back in time. They told us from 2015 going forward is when they had this newer system of data in place and that they did not retain from 2015 through 2017. So that would have provided a longer range of data, which would have allowed a more thorough view of the trends and usage.

THE COURT: How much usage was there in 2017 to 2018? It's two years, right?

MR. PATCHEN: The usage was approximately 770 users a month. That's what our damage expert determined based on the usage data, the two-day usage data that they provided.

THE COURT: 770 users per month.

MR. PATCHEN: Correct.

THE COURT: How much for the two-year period?

MR. PATCHEN: The royalty calculation that our damage expert used was based on a monthly usage, with a monthly royalty, for calculation purposes. So the 770 users per month

times 12.

THE COURT: What did your expert do, extrapolate them backwards and say it would be the same use between 2011 and 2017?

MR. PATCHEN: No. What he did was he extrapolated backwards to show that there was a significantly higher use in 2011. And that was because, as even Microsoft has argued, the product was no longer being actively promoted and it was on a downward trend, so by the time you get to 2017 to '18 the use was significantly less.

THE COURT: So 770 users per month was the end of a downward trend.

MR. PATCHEN: Correct.

THE COURT: How do you know that?

MR. PATCHEN: We know that because what we did is we used something called Google Trends, and Google Trends shows the relative interest in time between 2011 and 2017.

THE COURT: Google Trend?

MR. PATCHEN: Google Trends, plural.

THE COURT: What kind of method is that?

MR. PATCHEN: It is a method that has been used in academic literature, and our damage expert testified to it and referenced it in his report, as to a way to show relative interest. What Google Trends does, it says how many people were searching for a term, in this instance Dynamic Data, in

2011? How many people were searching for the same term from 2011 all the way through? And Microsoft actually uses Google Trends for other purposes.

THE COURT: Let me get the position of Microsoft.

Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. This is somewhat of a difficult issue. I want to try to cut through and start off with some points that I think really aren't in dispute. I will go through in a little more detail what actually happened with the documents, but the fundamental issue that really suggests the motion should be denied is the following.

The way that Mr. Patchen just characterized the searches that were done was a search for Dynamic Data. As you heard a little bit earlier from my colleague, Mr. Wolff, what is actually at issue --

THE COURT: Can I ask this question, Mr. Davis. Was there spoliation?

MR. DAVIS: There's documents and information that was lost. Our position is it's not relevant to the issues in this case. And as soon as we were alerted to the fact that counsel believed there was an issue, we took all the curative steps that we could. We put up our 30(b)(6) for another deposition. We paid for counsel to fly back out to Seattle or Bellevue and take an additional deposition.

THE COURT: In the end was usage data provided?

MR. DAVIS: There is certainly usage data that was provided from 2017 and on forward.

THE COURT: The relevant period begins with the patent, right?

MR. DAVIS: It does. And that is where I was going initially. The patent issued in 2011 and the damages experts agree that the relevant time frame for the hypothetical negotiation would have been around that time. Because Mr. Kaufman did not put Microsoft on notice of his patent, and Microsoft first got its notice with the filling of this suit in --

THE COURT: Maybe I am just misunderstanding this.

His damage will be based on a hypothetical royalty rate from

2011 forward, but that would be the rate. It would be

multiplied by the number of instances of infringement. That

would be your use. And so I ask you a simple question. At any

time did Microsoft produce to the plaintiff evidence of all

use? Did it give a full and complete answer to the

interrogatory how many times did you use the accused device?

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ DAVIS:}$ I understand your Honor's question, and I am going to try my best to answer it.

THE COURT: Can you answer it directly, please?

MR. DAVIS: Yes. Microsoft gave the plaintiffs all of the evidence that it had at the time that this issue arose.

THE COURT: Isn't it required that you give all

K1G8KAUC instances of use? MR. DAVIS: Can you repeat that? THE COURT: Shouldn't you be giving all instances of use? MR. DAVIS: We certainly should be giving them all instances of use. But the issue is, your Honor, how we define use. The telemetry that counsel is referring to doesn't actually identify use of the accused functionality, and that's the point that I was attempting to make. THE COURT: We will postpone this until 2:15. We will continue. (Luncheon recess)

AFTERNOON SESSION

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2:15 p.m.

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THE COURT: Be seated, please. Continue, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. I think the place to start and to go back to was during the argument I heard Mr. Patchen ask for a few remedies. The first remedy he sought was that Microsoft would not use any of the earlier telemetry data in response in its case, and we can agree that we won't do that.

THE COURT:

MR. DAVIS: The second remedy that he sought was that Microsoft not be allowed to effectively cross-examine their damages expert on the Google Trends analysis that he performed, and we believe that would be an inappropriate remedy.

THE COURT: Appropriate or inappropriate?

MR. DAVIS: Inappropriate. That we should be permitted to cross-examine their expert on the use of that Google Trends data.

THE COURT: How does he prove damages if there are no records and you should have produced the records?

MR. DAVIS: So, with your Honor's permission, I'd like just a few minutes to frame the issue, because I think if the Court will allow me to do so, I think we will answer that question.

THE COURT: I will ask Mr. Patchen to sit down.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you. Microsoft over time, since the relevant time that the patent issued, has had two telemetry systems. The first one that was in effect at the time that the patent issued has been referred to by the parties as SQM. That was in effect when the patent issued. It was in effect when this lawsuit was filed in 2016.

Importantly for purposes of this motion, your Honor, are two things: First, in the ordinary course of Microsoft's business that SQM data was rolled over such that it only went back 18 months, and because Microsoft had not received prior notice of this patent or the allegations of infringement until the lawsuit was filed, even if the Court were to accept everything that they have said as true and correct —

THE COURT: What's the filing date?

MR. DAVIS: Filing date of this lawsuit was April of 2016.

So even if this Court were to accept everything that the plaintiffs have said is true, the data would have only gone back 18 months earlier, because that is the first time

Microsoft received notice of these allegations and implemented a litigation hold as soon as it had such knowledge.

More importantly, your Honor, is the fact that --

THE COURT: October 2013.

MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Well, from October 2013. You would have

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had records up through --1 2 MR. DAVIS: '14. 3 THE COURT: From October 2013 forward. 4 MR. DAVIS: '14. Because the lawsuit was in April of 2016. 5 THE COURT: Correct, October 2014. 6 7 MR. DAVIS: So as your Honor aptly noted before we took the lunch break, the hypothetical negotiation in this case 8 9 the experts agree would have taken place in approximately 10 February of 2011. That data would not have existed in any 11 event within Microsoft because it only went back 18 months from 12 the time the lawsuit was filed. 13 An additional problem that the plaintiffs have is that 14 the data that did exist in that SQM system --15 THE COURT: Can I stop you? The two aspects for a royalty are rate and unit. When you fix a rate at the 16 17 beginning of a patent period you don't have units, you just have rate. Units occur over time. 18 19 So, what you have done is prevent the plaintiff from 20 proving units of damage between the date of the patent of 21 February 2011 and October 2014, roughly three and a half years. 22 MR. DAVIS: I disagree with that, and I would like to 23 explain to the Court why. 24 THE COURT: Is my arithmetic correct?

MR. DAVIS: Your arithmetic is correct, yes.

continue?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DAVIS: The reason why we disagree with what your Honor has said is because the data in the SQM system did not track usages of scaffolding in Dynamic Data, which is what Mr. Kaufman's expert has accused of infringement.

So, in other words, your Honor, even if the data did go back to 2011, it would not have shown usages of scaffolding in Dynamic Data. What that data showed were the times that users opened the Dynamic Data application. And I have an example that I think may be helpful.

THE COURT: You're telling me that a subset of that would have been appropriate.

MR. DAVIS: I'm not sure what your means by "would have been appropriate".

THE COURT: Some of the usages -- if you think of gross and net --

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- the evidence you had was of gross, and from that gross you had to extrapolate a net.

MR. DAVIS: I'm not sure I would go that far. I think a better analogy is the following, your Honor:

If the patent claims were directed to the example of someone using their ATM card to check their balance, the data that Microsoft had was the number of times that the ATM card

was inserted into the machine. So, in other words, even if Microsoft had had data back to 2011, they would not have been able to divine from that information how many actual usages of scaffolding were included within them. So, for that reason the data they would have gotten even if it existed would not have been relevant, and their expert agrees with that.

There is one other --

THE COURT: Well, it might not have been material but it would have been relevant.

Of all of those insertions of an ATM card, some would have been used for checking balances.

MR. DAVIS: You're correct, some of them would have been, and there would have been no way to decide.

THE COURT: So if you take the insertions of the ATM card as equivalent to gross, and the number of those that checked balances as net, that would give you the net figure.

But you couldn't get to the net figure until you had the gross.

MR. DAVIS: In that example your Honor is correct.

THE COURT: So a certain number of those SQMs were usages of what is alleged to be infringing.

MR. DAVIS: That's correct.

THE COURT: And we don't know what proportion.

MR. DAVIS: That's correct. And we would not have known whether the data existed or not.

THE COURT: So, what would have been the practical

effect in the development of a royalty rate as of February 2011? The task would have been made more difficult because the unit of measurement was gross and not net.

One way that people have to deal with that is to apply a lower percentage to the higher number of strikes of the SQM. In any event, how many measurements there were of that SQM would be relevant. It may not be dispositive of a problem. It may not have been material in that sense, but it's relevant. And Microsoft has eliminated the relevant evidence. That comes down to the spoliation.

MR. DAVIS: I understand what your Honor has said.

THE COURT: So the question is how to deal with that.

MR. DAVIS: Right.

THE COURT: And so one remedy they have is to take the number -- and I didn't know what Google Trends reflected, but as I understand it it's this: They measure in some fashion the number of times people inquire, use -- I don't understand -- inquire, I guess -- as to this allegedly infringing process. And they know that number for a certain number of years, but they don't know it for previous years. So a graph is constructed based on what is known to extrapolate back what was potentially in existence. That's what the expert wants to do. I don't know whether you call it Google Trends or anything else, but it's a statistical advice, in effect to draw a parabolic effect.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I understand and agree that that is what their expert wants to do, and because we understand that's what their expert wants to do, we did not move to exclude or prevent him from doing that. What Mr. Patchen --

THE COURT: What is it you want to do?

MR. DAVIS: I want to be able to cross-examine him. What Mr. Patchen asked for as his second proposed remedy is that when their expert presents that testimony with respect to Google Trends, that we not be allowed -- if I understand him correctly -- that we not be allowed to challenge that use because of this issue that they have raised.

THE COURT: What would be the basis of cross-examination?

MR. DAVIS: The basis of cross-examination, among other things, would be that the Google Trends data is unreliable. And the reason that we want to make that argument, your Honor, as I said --

THE COURT: In what respect? The measurement of the number of instances of inquiry?

MR. DAVIS: Right. Because the Google -- the testimony and the evidence in this case is going to show, your Honor, that what the Google Trends data showed was the number of hits on a search term, to simplify --

So, for example, what I understand their expert to

have done is to use Google Trends to determine how many people did a search for the term Dynamic Data over, you know, a six or seven year timeframe.

THE COURT: I suppose of those who inquired, they inquired to know so they could use, and some subset of that perfected itself in actual use.

The problem we have here is that we are searching for some equivalent to compensate for the destruction of information. Almost by definition that which is being proposed to be used is less accurate than actual measurements, and the dilemma for me is how I can have an appropriate remedy for the plaintiff without unjustly penalizing the defendant. So I have to allow you to cross-examine, but I don't know what the end of it is going to be.

MR. DAVIS: If I may, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because I don't feel I want to tell the jury that the reason that the expert is doing this is because the evidence that would be most relevant has been destroyed.

MR. DAVIS: I appreciate that dilemma, your Honor. I guess I would make two points -- one point and perhaps one suggestion.

The point is this: Again, I think it's important to keep this in mind. Because the hypothetical negotiation was in 2011, they would have had to have done this anyway to get back to that point.

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THE COURT: No, they would have determined in 2011, if the record that was being used was not sufficiently accurate, either the rate would have been discounted to some degree or an accurate measurement would have been inserted.

MR. DAVIS: The issue, your Honor, is that when they filed the lawsuit --

My only point in making that is that when they filed the lawsuit, the data only went back to 2014 under the ordinary course of Microsoft's business. So, if this had never happened, they still would have only had data back to 2014. So to get back to 2011, their expert would have needed to do the same — presumably would have done the same analysis that he has done now.

THE COURT: Would have created a graph the same way.

MR. DAVIS: So that was the point that I wanted to make.

THE COURT: We would have a trend line. There would be a statistical expert to discuss a trend line.

MR. DAVIS: So the related point there, your Honor — and I understand we have raised this — or this issue came up before we learned today that your Honor was planning to bifurcate the case — I think this is an issue that doesn't bear on validity or infringement at all.

THE COURT: No, it doesn't, but I want to settle it now, because my thought is that the jury would not be given a

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As soon as it delivered a verdict on validity and
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      break.
      infringement, if it were a plaintiff's verdict, it would go on
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      to damages immediately.
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               MR. DAVIS: I understand.
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               THE COURT: So I have to give you a ruling now.
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               What expert do you have on rates, royalty rates?
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     Mr. Abramson?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: What expert do we have?
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               THE COURT: On royalty rates.
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               MR. ABRAMSON: We have a damages expert Brian Dies.
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               THE COURT: What is he going to say?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: On the royalty rate he is going to talk
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      about a hypothetical negotiation. He is going to talk about a
      hypothetical negotiation in 2011 based on anticipated usage
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      from that date going forward.
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               THE COURT: And is customarily royalty rate adjusted
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      if the usage is more or less than that which is projected?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: It certainly enters into the
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      calculation, absolutely.
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               THE COURT: Is there any way to stipulate to this
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      information?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: To stipulate to which information?
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               THE COURT: Well, that which we're talking about.
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     reasonable equivalent to that which Microsoft would have had.
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               MR. ABRAMSON: I would expect there would be a
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substantial disagreement about that for the same reason that they challenge our expert analysis. I mean their report had in it --

THE COURT: Now, damages have to be proven as any other proposition of fact has to be proven.

MR. ABRAMSON: And we are prepared to do that.

THE COURT: What Mr. Davis wants to do is to impeach the accuracy of the information that you're using for damages, not having you allowed to use more accurate information.

He would have had an argument in the beginning that the information that exists is not sufficient, but that would have been overcome.

I'm going to make this as sort of a tentative ruling, that Mr. Davis can cross-examine the expert, but in so far as the expert's testimony is impeached on the basis that it is not sufficiently accurate, I'm going to have to figure out a way to tell the jury that the more accurate information does not exist because it had been destroyed by Microsoft.

MR. ABRAMSON: Your Honor, we think that would be an appropriate approach.

THE COURT: I know you like that, Mr. Abramson.

MR. ABRAMSON: Yeah. And I think that the rules --

THE COURT: I'm not really happy with it.

MR. ABRAMSON: I think the rules --

THE COURT: I'm not really happy with it.

MR. ABRAMSON: I understand, your Honor. I think the rules do contemplate such a remedy. If you look at the commentary to the Federal Rules on this topic -- is it Rule 37? Rule 37.

THE COURT: Is there any way for me to take damages as a judge issue and not a jury issue?

MR. ABRAMSON: If the parties agreed to it.

THE COURT: Yeah, that's really my question.

MR. ABRAMSON: I don't think we would -- I don't think we would be inclined to agree to that.

THE COURT: The rule also, Mr. Abramson, is that you are entitled to royalties not for the entire process but only for the part of the process that's infringed.

So, a royalty rate that might be available for the entire process would not be the same; it would be larger than the royalty rate for the part of it that is the invention.

MR. ABRAMSON: Well, your Honor, our expert factored that into his analysis very consciously, of course. You're only going to get entitled to remuneration for the value of the technology that's in their actual infringement. That's understood, and that was taken into -- that was taken into account in his report.

I think, you know, Mr. Davis also had some arguments here about what does and what doesn't infringe, and I think we would disagree with some of that. It's not so clear that some

of those downloads would not necessarily have infringed. There are issues there of fact there as well. It's not as --

THE COURT: I'm going to resolve this now. I don't think I'm getting more light on the subject.

I'm going to rule that -- and it's tentative -- that Mr. Davis can cross-examine the expert to show the weaknesses of the expert's analysis but -- as I believe the instruction to the jury will be -- when that is the best available evidence that can be taken as appropriate evidence to prove damages. I don't remember the exact terminology but it's something like that. And that's what I guess I will be charging.

OK, that motion is finished, it's granted, to the extent I granted it and denied it to the other extent.

MR. ABRAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, if I may, there was a related motion in limine that we had filed. I think effectively your Honor has ruled on that, but just for the record that was Microsoft's motion in limine number 22, I believe.

THE COURT: Let me go down in order.

So we finished with Kaufman's motions 1 through 3.

Microsoft's motion 1 moves to preclude Kaufman from arguing
that his Schemalive product practices the asserted claims. I
have ruled on that. That motion is granted.

Microsoft motion 2 moves to exclude mention of alleged spoliation. I'm going to reserve on that and rule at the end

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number of generalities.

of the direct examination. 1 MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, with respect to reserving in 2 3 direct examination, you mean the direct examination of the damages expert? 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. DAVIS: Right. So as it relates to the liability 7 phase of the trial --8 THE COURT: -- there won't be damages. We're not 9 getting into that. 10 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. THE COURT: Microsoft motion 3 moves to exclude 11 12 evidence of Microsoft's knowledge of prior Kaufman 13 publications. That's the willful infringement claim. 14 MR. DAVIS: Correct. 15 THE COURT: And I've ruled on that, so the motion is 16 granted. 17 It's not relevant to anything about infringement or 18 validity. Microsoft motion 4 moves to exclude reference to the 19 20 outcome of the inter partes review. That's granted. 21 All right. I think that deals with all the in 22 limines. Give me a moment to reorganize. 23 Going to the pretrial order. Let's talk first about a

The first phase will be validity and infringement.

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Now, theoretically and analytically a plaintiff can prove his 1 2 case by resting on the presumption of validity and going 3 directly to infringement. I suspect that's not your plan, 4 Mr. Abramson. That's correct, your Honor. 5 MR. ABRAMSON: 6 THE COURT: Tell us your plan. 7 MR. ABRAMSON: I'm sorry? 8 THE COURT: What is your plan? 9 MR. ABRAMSON: We're going to proceed --10 THE COURT: You're going to go first. 11 MR. ABRAMSON: We're going -- yes, I think our plan is 12 that we have a presumption of validity, absolutely, and then 13 we're going to proceed with ownership of the patent and the 14 fact that Microsoft --15 THE COURT: That's not challenged, is it? 16 MR. ABRAMSON: Pardon me? 17 THE COURT: Ownership is not challenged. 18 MR. ABRAMSON: Ownership is not challenged. 19 going to proceed with proof of infringement. 20 THE COURT: Well, are you going to have Mr. Kaufman as 21 your first witness? 22 MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, Mr. Kaufman will be the first 23 witness.

going to talk about issues of validity also, about what the

So, what is he going to talk about? Is he

THE COURT:

prior art was and how he thought his invention was something —

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, as background. We will save for

cross-examination and rebuttal such evidence as is submitted by

the defendant, to try to establish the defense of invalidity.

So, that's how we would handle that. So, Mr. Kaufman would

review the prior art in his efforts and development as

background for what his invention was, how it was done.

THE COURT: He would not be testifying as to the

issues of infringement.

MR. ABRAMSON: Sorry?

THE COURT: He would not be testifying in any way evaluating what the defendant did.

MR. ABRAMSON: He is not going to express opinions on it. He is going to present it. He is going to present the factual — he is going to present the factual basis upon which the expert, Professor Shasha, will address — Professor Shasha will be the one who compares the features of the claims against the accused.

THE COURT: So essentially you have two witnesses.

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes. And the coinventor, Micah Silverman, will also appear briefly to explain his role.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. ABRAMSON: And then after that our expert will go through the infringement analysis and also some foundation.

Well, I guess foundation as to damages is out now.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Davis, having heard this so far, any comments?

MR. DAVIS: I do, your Honor. That's just the concern about Mr. Kaufman offering what sounds like expert -- what is going to run right up to the line -- if not cross the line -- for expert testimony.

THE COURT: You will be objecting, won't you?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, I will.

THE COURT: Well, I can rule on it at that time, but he is not here as an expert.

Incidentally, I will just break in. Objections are made by standing and saying "objection". There is no explanation of objections. Unless I ask for it -- and I will ask for it -- if I do -- generally at a side bar. You can ask for side bars, but it's not likely I will be giving them. If I understand the issue, I will rule, and we will keep on going with the trial. I think side bars are very disruptive to a jury and I try to minimize their use.

MR. DAVIS: Can I ask for clarification, your Honor?

For issues that we might want to just get our objection on the record preserved, but to make sure that we are sticking to your Honor's rules, would your preference be that the first time that we are outside of the presence of the jury we just state that on the record?

THE COURT: No, just say "objection". You don't need

to do anything more. You're strongest, if there is an appellate issue, if you just say objection and I make a mistake.

MR. DAVIS: OK, I understand. The only reason I ask that question, I'm not quite sure what your Honor is aware of the basis of the objection.

THE COURT: Generally I can figure it out.

MR. DAVIS: I mean if the objection is it's beyond the scope of the report, for example, your Honor might not be immediately aware of that.

THE COURT: Well, I will figure it out.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Then it will be Mr. Davis' turn, and you will be proving — you will be denying infringement, and you will be starting to prove the issues of validity.

MR. DAVIS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Invalidity.

MR. DAVIS: That's correct.

THE COURT: And then I guess there will be rebuttal if necessary.

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes.

THE COURT: I am a little confused in terms of what kind of scope there will be on the rebuttal case with regard to validity.

1	MR. ABRAMSON: I think there could be considerable
2	rebuttal.
3	THE COURT: So, if there is considerable rebuttal,
4	I've got to give Mr. Davis additional time at the end to in
5	effect finish up and do a reply.
6	Now, you have given me a time. Are you comfortable
7	with the time that you've given me?
8	MR. ABRAMSON: You mean number of hours?
9	THE COURT: Yes.
10	MR. ABRAMSON: It might be a little tight. It might
11	be a little tight, because if those hours cover both the
12	liability and damages phase, it could be a little tight. But I
13	think
14	THE COURT: Then suppose we limit it to liability and
15	infringement.
16	MR. ABRAMSON: Pardon me?
17	THE COURT: We limit the time estimates
18	MR. ABRAMSON: Then I think that's adequate.
19	THE COURT: to the issues of the first phase of the
20	trial, liability and infringement validity and infringement.
21	MR. ABRAMSON: I think 16 hours is adequate.
22	THE COURT: And that starts with the opening and goes
23	right through the closing.
24	MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, per side.
25	MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, obviously if that is the

Court's order, we will abide by that. We actually agreed to 16 hours expecting that that would be both liability and damages. We think it's more than that.

THE COURT: I'm likely to give you both a little more time because I think it's going to be difficult getting the jury to understand this patent.

That was the next question. How will you educate the jury with regard to the patent?

MR. ABRAMSON: Well, Mr. Kaufman gave the tutorial here at the outset, and I think he is very capable of doing that.

THE COURT: He can do that in his proof by asking him questions and having him answer?

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, because it's relevant to how he came up with this invention, how he implemented it.

against the claims, so it's necessary for the jury to understand not only the overall concept and not only what he had in mind in relationship to what he thought was an invention but also with respect to the specific claims. And he cannot give a tutorial. He is a witness. He is a fact witness, and that steps out of his role as a fact witness.

You have to give the tutorial.

MR. ABRAMSON: I'm perfectly giving the tutorial, your Honor. I mean I can, and I am happy to do it.

THE COURT: Why don't you as part of your opening -- or, better still, we will count this -- yes, it's part of your opening.

Show the patent to the jury, take the jury through the patent, explain it, go through the terms, go through the Markman definitions. And then in his opening Mr. Davis will counter that to whatever extent he thinks appropriate.

Mind you, objections are appropriate during openings.

I know some judges take a dim view of objections during opening and summations. I do not. If you have an objection, make them.

Is that satisfactory, Mr. Davis?

MR. DAVIS: My expectation was that the ordinary course of things would be that their expert would do that.

Yes, it's satisfactory provided that we're not going to have Professor Shasha get up a day later or a day and a half later and just completely redo everything that Mr. --

THE COURT: No, it won't be appropriate for him to repeat.

MR. ABRAMSON: He will not, your Honor.

THE COURT: The patent is Exhibit 1 in evidence in effect, and we start from that. And when you're putting in an exhibit, you can show the exhibit to the jury and take them through it. And I would like you to do that, Mr. Abramson, so the jury understands.

MR. ABRAMSON: OK.

THE COURT: This is a great challenge for me. It's the first patent case that I've tried, and I don't think there has been much experience in the court with patent cases tried to a jury.

I have a very strong belief that the jury can and must understand everything that goes into the trial. It's my job to make sure that that happens, and I'm delegating that responsibility to both of you so the jury understands what it is we're talking about.

I do not want the jury to make rulings on the basis of some ill-conceived and ambiguous notion of what a patent is or what is involved here. So, it's a challenge to you.

With respect to the potential infringement, that's all going to be experts, but with the patent itself I think both of you are capable of doing that.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, if I may, in almost all of the patent trials that I have been a part of, in order to aid the jury we have prepared binders that contain at least a copy of the patent and the list of claim constructions so that at the time --

THE COURT: Would you please combine and agree to the binder that you give to the jury?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, we can do that.

THE COURT: And that binder will stay with the jury

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throughout. 1 MR. ABRAMSON: Yeah. I mean it should not be 2 3 argumentative; it should be straightforward, no spin to it. 4 THE COURT: Right, right. 5 The other thing that I would --MR. DAVIS: 6 THE COURT: I won't say anything about sting, but no 7 spin. 8 MR. ABRAMSON: No spin. 9 MR. DAVIS: The other thing I would raise -- I'm not 10 sure your Honor is aware of this -- but the Federal Judicial 11 Center also has a video that they have made. 12 THE COURT: I have seen the video; it's not to be 13 played. 14 Thank you. MR. DAVIS: 15 THE COURT: I don't care for the video. 16 How do you present exhibits? Is it going to be on a 17 screen? 18 MR. ABRAMSON: We have hard copies of the exhibits, and we also are prepared to present them on the screen. 19 20 noticed that there are screens --21 THE COURT: The jury has screens. 22 MR. ABRAMSON: I don't know where the screen is in the 23 courtroom. Is that it, or is there another one? 24 THE COURT: We have a screen. We have a screen, and

people can access the screen through computers or through the

Elmo.

MR. ABRAMSON: OK. So we have a screen, a projector and an Elmo, and I think that would be fine.

The other question is publishing things to the jury. I guess that system does that to some extent.

THE COURT: There is in effect one screen for two jurors. You can go look at it. Have a look.

MR. ABRAMSON: I saw it. I took a look at it before. It's pretty hard to see, I think, for two jurors. They are relatively small screens.

THE COURT: I can't do better than that.

Bridget, we are talking about the presentation of evidence. We have a screen, right? Yes. We have a screen and you can access the screen either from your computers or through an Elmo. You should work through what you are going to be doing with the technician in the court.

DEPUTY COURT CLERK: It's 805-0134.

THE COURT: Make sure it's set up. I have used that in many cases -- used the system in many cases -- and the jurors have no problem in seeing what they have to see.

MR. ABRAMSON: The binder you referred to, is that something you would make a copy for every juror?

THE COURT: No, you don't have to do any copies at all. You don't have print. You don't have to publish anything or distribute anything. It's on the screen and it's on their

screens and my screen.

MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry, I think the question that I thought Mr. Kaufman -- the question I think Mr. Abramson was asking about was the binders that we are going to agree to give the jury.

THE COURT: Only the patent and the patent construction.

MR. DAVIS: Right. And so we will give each -- at least with the Court's permission, we will give each one of the jurors a binder that has those two things in it.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. ABRAMSON: That's what I was asking.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. DAVIS: OK. And in terms of --

THE COURT: And the exhibits themselves as they come in, they will be premarked -- they have already been premarked -- and you will present them through the screens.

MR. ABRAMSON: What I had in mind was the binder that we're going to meet and confer on, everybody gets that. The rest of them are published through the screens and presumably go into the jury room for deliberations.

THE COURT: Exhibits will not go in to the jury unless they ask for it, but you will have them ready to present. And those hard copies will be better in that sense.

MR. DAVIS: If I may, your Honor --

THE COURT: The jurors will each have notebooks, and so they will take their notes, and they can take their notes into the deliberation room, and if they want something, they know how to call for it.

MR. DAVIS: On behalf of Microsoft, your Honor, our expectation was that we will be using a trial presentation system to present the evidence electronically.

We also would -- with the Court's permission -typically follow a practice whereby on direct and
cross-examination we would have a hard copy binder of the
exhibits that we intend to use so that the Court and the
witness and counsel would have at their fingertips.

THE COURT: I read what you proposed in the pretrial order, and I approve it.

OK. I am looking at the bottom of page 9 of the pretrial order. The jury will not be given copies of discovery responses. Counsel can read what is an admission into evidence. To that extent the bottom paragraph is modified. It's not clear to me what you want to use with deposition evidence in addition to live testimony.

MR. ABRAMSON: We have certain evidence -- well, we have certain evidence -- documents, for example -- from Microsoft that would come in. It has to come in through somebody, and that would be the vehicle.

THE COURT: What documents? By nature of admissions,

1 you mean? 2 MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, absolutely. 3 THE COURT: So there is no dispute as to authenticity. MR. ABRAMSON: Not on those, I don't believe so. 4 THE COURT: You can present it as an exhibit. 5 6 MR. ABRAMSON: Yeah. Normally I would want to have a 7 witness to put it in through. THE COURT: Why? Who could be a witness to that? 8 9 lawyer? 10 MR. ABRAMSON: In some cases the person who wrote the 11 document or who otherwise authenticated it during the 12 deposition. 13 THE COURT: If it's a witness, then the witness comes 14 in and the normal rules of witnesses apply. If it's an 15 admission, you can put it in yourself. But you don't need someone on the stand for admission. 16 17 MR. ABRAMSON: If the Court will accept us just offering documents as admissions, then we could probably -- I 18 19 understand we can eliminate the deposition, but we can limit 20 it. 21 THE COURT: I'm not prepared to do that. I don't know 22 what you have in mind. I can't really rule on that. 23 Before we get into the exhibits --24 MR. ABRAMSON: I mean some of the deposition 25 testimony, the oral testimony at the deposition, is also in the

1 nature of admissions.

THE COURT: Let me be clear on this. If there is a live witness, there is no deposition testimony.

MR. ABRAMSON: Understood.

THE COURT: However, that which is admitted by the party can come in separately. You and Mr. Davis will put that into evidence. You will say page so and so, line so and so, the following is offered as an admission of the party, and you will offer it.

MR. ABRAMSON: That's exactly what we have in mind.

THE COURT: OK. Mr. Davis?

MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir. Your Honor, with respect to cross-examination, our expectation was that we would probably have in reserve impeachment clips as necessary that we would play by video if we needed to, and my understanding --

THE COURT: You can present the video to the witness. There is a screen.

MR. DAVIS: And my understanding -- based on an earlier transcript that I saw from your Honor -- is that what your Honor would like is for us to first hand up the written transcript so that your Honor can confirm that it's proper impeachment, and then we can play the video? Correct?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you.

MR. ABRAMSON: And Mr. Patchen reminds me that we do

1	have a few video clips of Microsoft witnesses that we would
2	want to play people who are not appearing here live.
3	THE COURT: People who are not appearing.
4	MR. ABRAMSON: Yes.
5	THE COURT: And you want them as witnesses.
6	MR. ABRAMSON: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Their entire testimony.
8	MR. ABRAMSON: For certain clips from their deposition
9	testimony.
10	THE COURT: And offering them as what? Testimony? Or
11	as admissions?
12	MR. ABRAMSON: Testimony that provides admissions.
13	THE COURT: Is this testimony as to something that a
14	witness saw, or heard, or did?
15	MR. ABRAMSON: Yes.
16	THE COURT: OK, so you put it in. It's almost as if
17	that person is here.
18	MR. ABRAMSON: Pardon me?
19	THE COURT: That person can't come to the trial.
20	MR. ABRAMSON: If that person can't come to the trial.
21	THE COURT: You want the person here?
22	MR. ABRAMSON: If the person is here, we could
23	THE COURT: Have you asked Mr. Davis to produce him?
24	MR. ABRAMSON: We have asked.
25	THE COURT: Mr. Davis?

25

1 MS. EDELMAN: We haven't received any trial subpoenas, your Honor, for specific witnesses. They have not specifically 2 3 asked us to present any witnesses in person. 4 THE COURT: Live witnesses are much preferred. MR. DAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. So what we have 5 6 agreed to in advance is that Microsoft was intending to bring 7 to the trial at least Mr. Groff and Mr. Hunter, and I believe those were on counsel's list. 8 9 THE COURT: Why don't you just talk together. If 10 there is any dispute, bring it to me. Otherwise --11 MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir. MS. EDELMAN: One related issue I would raise with the 12 13 And maybe I'm off base, thinking of something else. videos. 14 But there were some videos played during the depositions of 15 Microsoft witnesses, and those videos I believe also appear in the exhibit list, and I just want to clarify that --16 17 THE COURT: They're not exhibits. They're not 18 exhibits. They can use them in the cross-examination. 19 MS. EDELMAN: OK. OK. 20 THE COURT: And if it's an admission, we don't need 21 pictures; we can just read it in from a transcript. 22 MS. EDELMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: OK. 24 MR. DAVIS: Pardon me, your Honor, while thinking

about it, is it the Court's practice to submit to the jury

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trial testimony -- if it's requested -- in written form?
1
                          When they're deliberating?
 2
               THE COURT:
                          Yes, sir.
 3
               MR. DAVIS:
 4
               THE COURT:
                          If they ask for certain testimony to be
 5
      reread, generally I will have the reporter reproduce the pages
      that are involved -- without objections and the like -- counsel
6
 7
      will review them and then they will go to the jury.
               MR. DAVIS: Understood.
 8
               THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Abramson? You're just
9
10
      stretching?
11
               MR. ABRAMSON: Yes.
12
               THE COURT: All right. What do you want me to do with
13
      the objections?
14
               MR. ABRAMSON: Well, we have a long list of
15
      objections. I don't know whether your Honor wants to go
16
      through them today or reserve them as they come up.
17
               THE COURT: I'd rather reserve them as they come up,
18
      unless there is some principal that you want me to deal with
19
      now.
20
               MS. EDELMAN: Nothing from Microsoft. And we expect
21
      that in light of your Honor's rulings today that many of the
22
      exhibits and their objections would come out.
23
               THE COURT: OK, so I don't need to do anything for
24
      this.
25
               MS. EDELMAN: No, our preference would be to deal with
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them as they would come up with the respective witnesses that they would be brought in through.

THE COURT: That's fine.

Avoid duplication of exhibits, please. Have you done that?

MR. ABRAMSON: We have tried. We have made an effort.

THE COURT: I'm going to sign the pretrial order. Do

you have the original? And Ms. Jones will file it.

I'm going to file this one.

There will be eight people on the jury. We will have an array of 14. I have your proposals for voir dire, and we will go through them.

I will ask the questions. If a person cannot sit, another person will replace that juror. And I will ask the juror who is replacing if there are any answers that he wishes to give me to any of the questions that I've asked. If there are, I will take them up, and we will make challenges for cause as we go along.

At the end of this process there is a questionnaire that is given that will address personal items: Where were you born? Where do you live? Who is in your household? What education you've had? What jobs you've had? What magazines do you read? What do you watch on the Internet? So on. And then you will exercise your peremptories at your seat, three peremptories each side. You will give me the challenges on a

25

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note paper -- one from each side -- and then we will go into
1
 2
      the jury room and strike those who have been stricken.
                                                               If you
 3
      don't exercise all your peremptories or you coincide with your
 4
      exercise peremptories, I will excuse the highest numbered
 5
      backwards until we have a jury of eight, and that will be the
6
      jury.
 7
               MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, is it the Court's practice to
      provide counsel with the list of the venire before the jury
8
9
      selection begins?
10
               THE COURT:
                          No.
11
               MR. DAVIS:
                           Thank you.
12
               MR. ABRAMSON: It leaves room for the possibility to
13
      lose two jurors?
14
               THE COURT: Can't hear you.
15
               MR. ABRAMSON: That leaves the possibility to lose two
16
      jurors.
17
               THE COURT: That's right.
18
               MR. ABRAMSON: What about cause? Challenges?
19
               THE COURT: There are no alternates. As you challenge
20
      for cause and it's granted, or a juror can't sit, another juror
21
      from the overall array comes in here and fills the seat.
22
               MR. ABRAMSON: All eight jurors --
23
               THE COURT: Ms. Jones, how many people will you call,
24
      I think?
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DEPUTY COURT CLERK: I called 25.

THE COURT: We have 25 people. I think we need a few more because it's going to be a month trial. It will go Monday through Thursday. I have my overall calendar on Friday. We will go 10 o'clock to 5 o'clock. There will be a midmorning 15 minute break, something like that. Lunch is around one o'clock for an hour and 15 minutes. Usually jurors can dispense with the afternoon break. And we will go as close to as close to five as we can. Ms. Jones will keep the time and let you know as we go along.

Your time estimate seems suitable to me, but priority number one is to ensure that the jurors understand the case.

If you need more time, we will take it. We are going to have 30 people come up.

MR. ABRAMSON: Any expectation as to how far we will get the first day?

THE COURT: You should be prepared to put on your first witness -- do the openings first. And then you have the claims construction, so it's not likely that we will have a witness on for the first day.

All right. I think I have said everything I need to say. Any questions, Mr. Abramson?

MR. ABRAMSON: No questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Davis?

MR. DAVIS: None, your Honor.

THE COURT: I look forward to seeing you then.

25

1 MR. ABRAMSON: Thank you. 2 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Can I get an agreed set of facts from you? 4 MR. ABRAMSON: Pardon me? 5 THE COURT: Can I get an agreed set of facts? 6 MS. EDELMAN: Yes, your Honor, they were in the 7 pretrial order. THE COURT: We have it, OK. I might shorten it. 8 9 I am not planning to give an elaborate set of preliminary 10 instructions. I think all I need to say is that there are 11 going to be two phases to this trial -- the opening part of 12 this trial -- which will examine the validity of the patent and 13 whether or not the patent was infringed. So plaintiff has the 14 burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence -- and I will explain what a preponderance of the 15 evidence is -- and defendant has the burden of proving that the 16 17 patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence. And I will attempt to define that. 18 And I will tell them that we start with a presumption 19 20 of validity, but if the defendant puts in evidence to question 21 that, the presumption disappears, and the defendant must then 22 be judged by whether he has proven his case by clear and 23 convincing evidence. And then we start. OK. 24 MR. ABRAMSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Are any of your defenses to be tried to

K1G7KAU2 the judge and not to a jury? Mr. Davis? Like estoppel, for example, is that really going to be --MS. EDELMAN: Your Honor, there are some defenses that may be more appropriate for your Honor including estoppel. THE COURT: I think we will deal with that in the closing conference. MS. EDELMAN: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: We will have a conference at the end of the case to go over the charge, and then we will carve out what we need to carve out at that point. That's it. Thanks very much. (Adjourned)